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DO WE THINK IN WORDS?
BEHAVIORIST VS. INTROSPECTIVE CONCEPTIONS
BY ARTHUR S. OTIS
Stanford University
I. Purpose of the Discussion.—The following discussion
takes its departure from the reading of Dr. John B. Watson's
' Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist.'
It is the purpose of the writer to discuss certain hypotheses
which are put forth with seeming conviction in the text but
which are believed by the writer to be false.
To discuss the whole subject of the Behaviorist point of
view, in relation to the more generally accepted points of
view in psychology would be quite impossible in the scope of
this article. That a text in psychology should be written
in which the author not only purposefully avoids the mention
of such concepts as perception, ideation, association of ideas,
consciousness, attention, will, etc., but even goes so far as
to claim that these concepts are useless for purposes of
psychology, is of course quite a source of wonder. The
indispensability of the concepts avoided by Behaviorist
psychology and of the use of introspection will be apparent,
we believe, from the discussion of but one 'assumption'
which it makes. We shall confine this article to the discussion
of this assumption.
The hypothesis referred to is 'the point of view that has
been advocated throughout the text, namely, that thought
is the action of language mechanisms' (p. 316). The mean-
ing of the expression, language mechanisms, is carefully
defined by the author as referring to any of those muscles
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of the body which actuate to produce words whether spoken,
written, or gesticulated (as by deaf mutes). The meaning
of the word, thought, as used in this hypothesis is not ex-
plicitly stated, but may be inferred with confidence from
various passages which we shall quote1 and is here taken to
be the same as the meaning of thought when used by those
who are not Behaviorists.
To be sure, the author states in the preface that "the
terms thinking and memory have been carefully redefined
in conformity with Behaviorist psychology." On page 14
we find in italics the expression: '"thinking," by which we
mean subvocal talking.' This may constitute the re-defini-
tion, but if so it obviously begs the question which we are
discussing; namely whether 'thinking' as ordinarily under-
stood does consist of subvocal talking. We shall therefore
leave this re-definition out of account.
It will be realized that the adjustment of an individual
to his environment may involve acts requiring mental
activity of all degrees of consciousness, from the most auto-
matic habitual or instinctive acts requiring little or no
consciousness, such as moving the eyes toward an object it
is desired to see, to the solving of problems requiring the
1
 "A man may sit motionless at his desk with pen in hand and paper before him.
In popular parlance we may say he is idle or 'thinking,' but our assumption is that his
muscles are really as active and possibly more active than if he were playing tennis.
But what muscles? Those muscles which have been trained to act when he is in
such a situation, his laryngeal, tongue, and speech muscles generally" (p. 15).
"We manipulate vocally" (when trying to think of the name of a familiar person)
"by running over the names beginning with each succeeding letter of the alphabet,
or by saying 'black hair,' 'blue eyes,' 'six feet tall,' and the like" (p. 305).
"The explicit and implicit language habits are formed along with the explicit
bodily habits and are bound up with them and become a part of every total unitary
action system that the human organism forms. . . . They are present in the simplest
types of adjustment that he makes. We can see the functioning of language habits
only slightly in certain activities, as, for example, in swimming, tapping on the table
with a pencil, while in certain other types they form an integral part . . . " (p. 309).
"Our view is that overt language develops under social training. It is thus
absorbed into and becomes a part of every total integration of the individual. Hence
when he is making adjustments in the absence of other like beings language remains
as part of the process" (p. 323).
" . . . the maiden thinks of her lover in words the beautiful thoughts
of the idealist for mankind as a whole or of the mother for her child . . . are couched
in words or their equivalent" (p. 325).
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most concentrated mental effort. It is hardly conceivable
that the Behaviorist would claim that all such adjustment
involves language mechanisms, as the passages quoted would
imply if taken literally. To simplify matters, however, we
will limit our discussion to that type of adjustment ordinarily
referred to as 'thinking,' namely, those mental processes of
the problem-solving sort which require some degree of con-
scious mental effort, since these are open to introspective
investigation. That even these processes of adjustment do
not necessarily require language we shall attempt to show by
appeal to logic and common experience, omitting arguments
ad hominem.
2. Examples of Thinking.—Let us consider one or two
simple cases of problem solving and subject them to critical
psychological analysis in order to determine whether they
involve language.
Suppose I have unfolded a new map and am attempting
to fold it again as it was. I have no complete habit, not
having folded a map exactly like this before. Let us see
what happens. Surely there is a better way than to let
someone watch me and report his inferences. He would
merely see me look at the map and, let us say, try to fold it
in one way but fail and then try another way and succeed.
He might infer that my method was the so-called 'trial and
error' or 'perseverance' method. Or if my lips have moved
he might infer that I arrived at the solution of the problem
by means of the action of the muscles of my lips and other
speech organs. This appears to be the method of the
Behaviorist.
Let me introspect and report from direct observation
what happened from the point of view of one looking on
from the inside. The writer does not wish to be misunder-
stood as assuming that introspection is infallible. One's
testimony is not infallible even when he observes with his
own eyes an incident which transpires directly before him.
Relatively speaking however, introspection is far more
direct and reliable than inference based upon observation
from the outside.
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On introspection I report as follows regarding my action
with the map. More or less mechanically, as we say, that
is, while thinking about what I had 6een on the map, I
began to fold the map along one of the creases. After a
moment I became aware that the map was not falling into
its accustomed folds. I then became aware of the need of
finding the correct way to fold the map and I unfolded it in
order to begin again. I recalled from previous experience
that the crease on which the first fold must be made is one
which runs entirely across the paper. I therefore looked
for such a fold and on finding it folded the paper on it and
repeated the process until the map was entirely folded up,
making no further error.
Now this adjustment which I have made to the problem
of folding the map was 'thinking,' alike in the popular
usage and that of the psychologist. The Behaviorist claims
that thinking is the action of language mechanisms. Let us
go over this example of thinking again and examine it very
minutely to see whether there is any necessary connection
between language and the solving of the problem.
First of all, how do I become aware that the map is not
falling into its accustomed folds? If I go slightly back of
this awareness I note a feeling of contradiction between a
subconsciously expected feeling of flatness and the experienced
feeling of bulginess. This contradiction, we may say, caused
me to become aware of the improper folding of the map—
caused the shift of my attention from the thoughts of what I
had seen on the map to the matter of folding the map.1
How did I then become aware of the need of finding the
correct way of folding the map? The experience suggests
no other explanation than merely to say that the idea of
contradiction 'called up' or 'suggested' the idea of need.
This idea in turn called up the idea of beginning again.
We may explain this process by saying that it was probably
lThat a subconscious awareness of contradiction may give rise to an idea of
need, together with an affective state which effects a shift of attention (clear aware-
ness) to the need, is a matter of so frequent observation in structural psychology as to
be considered a scientific fact. Such a fact, however, is of course quite unthought of
in Behaviorist psychology, being wholly outside of its scope.
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the result of a previously formed habit. One has learned
in such cases that it is best to begin again. When the idea
of unfolding the map again has come to occupy more or less
of the whole of consciousness, 'the thought takes form in
action.' Behaviorist psychology concedes such a phenom-
enon, so we need not attempt to explain it. Having unfolded
the map I recalled previous experiences regarding the folding
of large sheets of paper. We will say that the perception
of the paper, before me and the idea of need of folding, to-
gether served to bring forth from my memory store those
ideas which came to my mind. These together with the
perceptions of the map during the process of folding served
to educe that train of ideas which guides the folding to a
successful termination.
Now what is the material of all this mental activity?
What do these ideas consist of? They consist of images,
visual, tactual, kinaesthetic, etc., of maps, and of certain
aspects of these images such as creases, folding movements,
flatness, bulginess, etc. They have nothing to do with
language, necessarily. The idea of flatness is tactual or
visual or both, the idea of a folding movement may be visual
or kinsesthetic or both. The idea of the length or direction
of a crease is visual or kinaesthetic or both. Possibly other
types of imagery enter to a slight extent. But no language
need be involved.
Let us now consider another type of thinking. Let the
reader ask himself why it is more difficult to play a game of
chess blindfolded than with the chess board visible before
him. Obviously the answer is that the perception of the
relative positions of the chess men is a great aid to the mental
manipulation which constitutes the basis of the study of
moves. Moreover, anyone who has played chess or checkers
will immediately appreciate the aid that would be derived
from actually making the trial moves that are contemplated,
in more clearly appreciating the relations that such moves
would introduce. If the thinking were done by means of
subvocal language it would seem that seeing or not seeing
the chess board would make no difference. The obvious
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answer is that the thinking is done by means of the per-
ceptions of the board and men as they are, the mental imaging
of the movement of the men into new positions and the
appreciation of the spacial and temporal relations between
the pieces and their possible moves as introduced after the
mental manipulation. No language whatever is required.
As we shall show, a person may indeed talk to himself while
contemplating moves, but this activity is entirely secondary
and supplementary.
3. The Material of Thought.—Thinking, as an adjustment
of the individual to his environment, as the solving of prob-
lems, consists of the evolving of new ideas, concepts, or
meanings, from old. This is accomplished by recombination
of the elements of the old into new patterns. By ideas,
concepts, and meanings are meant image patterns, whether
they be of words, objects seen, sounds heard, things felt,
tasted, sensed in any manner whatsoever, or any quality,
attribute, or aspect of such image patterns as may be con-
ceived separately by abstraction, such as shape, color, surface,
volume, extent, duration, intensity, symmetry, movement,
similarity, difference, causality, symbolism, abstractness or
affective quality; or of whatever degree of clearness or
attenuation or incipiency the images or image aspects may be.
We may think, therefore; that is, we may evolve new ideas,
concepts, meanings, in terms of image patterns of any kind
whatsoever, or of the consciousness (idea) of any relationship
whatsoever between these image patterns.
For example, I am thinking when I am effortfully engaged
in composing a piece of music. I sit at the piano with music
paper at my side. My mind is occupied with perceptions
and images of tones, tone combinations, tone sequences, tone
relationships, tone emotional effects, tone symbols (dots on
paper) the making of these symbols, etc.
My effort consists in the maintenance of my attention to
the work, the calling up of sequences of tone images,1 the
1
 Strictly speaking I adopt the mind set that will result in the calling up of tone
images, or that is calculated to do so. (Sometimes I may succeed better than at
other times.) We cannot call up an image necessarily at will. Generally it is a case
of talcing a certain mental attitude ordinarily called 'trying to think' which usually
results in the recall of the idea desired.
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comparison of these, the appraisal of their respective aesthetic
values, the choice of one or another, the calling up of the
proper symbols of notation in which to write down the
musical ideas, and the writing of these. No language is
involved in any of this thinking (except perhaps a final
translation of the results of thought into symbols). In this
case also I may compose without the piano; but this is more
difficult, since I am compelled to make my judgments upon
images only, whereas with the piano I may employ the per-
ceptions of the tones themselves in my judgments. If my
musical thinking were all done by means of the action of
speech muscles we do not see that it would make any differ-
ence whether the piano were struck or not.
Similarly, one is thinking when he is creating a new archi-
tectural design, or a drawing or painting or statue or stage
setting, or conceiving of a new dance movement or inventing
a new mechanical contrivance or playing tennis or searching
for the cause of engine trouble. The material of one's
thoughts in all these cases is in the form of images, which
need be only visual, auditory, tactual, kinsesthetic, may be,
in fact, of any kind whatever according to the requirements
or to one's ability to call forth such images. As we have
said, one may do any amount of talking to oneself while
thinking—which is merely putting one's thoughts in words
after they are thought—but the talking is not the thinking.
It is supplementary to it in exactly the same way that
describing a landscape is supplementary to seeing it.
Thinking may be called the controlled association of ideas,
in contradistinction to the free association of ideas. In the
free association of ideas, by which we refer to what is ordi-
narily called day dreaming or revery, ideas follow one another
in a more or less unguided manner, yet in a fairly rational
way as compared with the incongruous manner of idea se-
quence sometimes experienced in dreams. Doubtless there
is some sort of control even in 'free association' though it
may be the general interest in the subject of thought or the
control occasioned by thought habits. However, in what we
have called controlled association of ideas characterizing
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thinking, the ideas are guided in their sequence by some
conscious aim, e.g., a problem to be solved. Irrelevant ideas
are discarded (attended from), relevant ideas are attended to.
That which does the controlling is often also in the form of a
definite idea. This is best illustrated when one is given
two digits written one above the other: if told to add them,
under the influence of this guiding idea they call forth their
sum; if told to subtract one from the other, under the control
of this guiding idea they suggest their difference. The same
stimuli give rise to either one or another idea according to
the nature of an additional and controlling idea.
Similarly, we may have occasion to think of the opposite
of a given concept, or of a subordinate, or the superordinate
or the symbol of a given concept. In any case one idea calls
up a second under the guidance of a third.
We may not only occupy our minds with ideas of the
color, size, shape, etc., of objects, as referred to above, but
we may compare two objects as to color, size, shape, weight,
motion, acceleration, symmetry, etc., and judge which is
the best suited to our needs. Of two individuals we may
compare the good looks, cordiality, sincerity, hospitality,
integrity, adaptability, intelligence, etc., as conceived in
ideas of conduct, feelings, appearance, facial expression, and
of the many circumstances under which the impressions were
gained. All these mental activities dealing with ideas as
material—their association, recall, generalization, abstrac-
tion, comparison, judgment, etc., are elements in adaptation?
yet they may be experienced or accomplished quite inde-
pendently of words. The idea of a color is not a word. The
idea of one color being more intense than another need not
have anything to do with language. The choice of this or
that color for an aesthetic purpose does not require language,
nor does the act which the choice calls forth. Yet all this
is adaptation.
4. Words may be the Material of Thought.—As has been
suggested throughout the discussion, words may be the
material of thought. The place of words in the range of
material of thought may be stated as follows. The material
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of thought, as explained below, begins with perceptions;
then come images resembling perceptions, then more and
more attenuated images or aspects of images singled out by
abstraction, and finally symbols. By symbol is meant any
concept which is used in place of another. The best illustra-
tion of thinking in symbols is in the case of the number symbol
system used in arithmetic and algebra. The idea of eight
(not in the word but the number: ***•****) ;s represented
by the symbol: 8. The idea of seven (seven things: *******)
is symbolized by the figure: 7. Now if we have the problem
of finding the sum of these numbers (******** and *******)
we may do so by translating them into their respective
symbols and give our attention to the symbols only. Having
previously formed an association between the symbols, 7
and 8, and the symbol of their sum: 15, the symbol 15 is
called up when the symbols, 7 and 8, and the guiding idea
of summation are in mind. We may then proceed to make
other arithmetical computations in terms of number symbols
only, letting these call up the number idea (****—) when
needed. Similarly in algebra we may let x represent one
number with which the problem deals and let y represent
another number, etc., and then by means of habits established
in connection with these symbols we may do thinking of a
simple type in lieu of what would be far more difficult if done
with the original concepts of number. This type of thinking
is exemplified in the following algebraic reasoning:
If x2 — y2 = z then (x — y)(x + y) = %•
There are of course many kinds of symbols. In addition
to the number symbols just mentioned there are the symbols
of operation upon numbers such as those of addition, multi-
plication, integration, involution, etc., there are the symbols
of musical notation, symbols of punctuation (?, !, ", *, -),
symbols on maps representing roads, trees, buildings, bridges,
tunnels, etc. (an engineer can think very effectively in these
symbols). There are even symbolic facial expressions used
by actors to portray emotions which off the stage would not
be expected to produce those expressions. A skull and
cross bones symbolizes danger. The flag symbolizes country,
408 ARTHUR S. OTIS
etc. Last, and most important, of course, words and sen-
tences symbolize thought of every description. Occasionally
we feel that we have experienced some thought or sensation
or feeling which cannot be expressed in words. But in
general all ordinary thoughts and feelings can be represented
by some word or sentence.
We see therefore that language constitutes only one of the
various kinds of symbolization, and symbols constitute only one
type of material of thought.
Words are themselves the material of thought under many
circumstances. Whenever we have to communicate thoughts
to another or learn the thoughts of another through language
we have to deal with words. By far the greatest use of
language of course is in the calling up of language symbols
to represent meanings or the calling up of meanings repre-
sented by language. Occasionally however we may think
in terms of language almost exclusively, as when dealing with
the rhyme and rhythm of poetry. In the case of syllogistic
reasoning we may be truly said to be thinking in words, when
the expression "All A is B and all B is C" calls up the language
idea: "All A is C," or when part of a sentence suggests the
rest as "All is not gold that ."
5. Language the Symbolization of Meaning.—We have
attempted throughout this discussion to distinguish clearly
between a meaning and the language by which it is symbol-
ized. We cite the following illustrations to bring out this
distinction still more clearly.
If one says: " I saw John Jones on the street this morning "
the hearer will get the meaning of the sentence at once.
"Getting the meaning" means to the ordinary person getting
an image, more or less faint perhaps, of the speaker looking
at Jones on the street. But let us take another sentence.
Here is one in which the meaning of a new (coined) word is
stated. Every word in the statement of the definition except
the new one is perfectly intelligible and familiar and the
statement is a perfectly logical and meaningful one, yet we
are confident that the reader will not get the meaning from
the language on first reading. This is the sentence: "Let
DO WE THINK IN WORDS? 409
us define th-• word, incration, as meaning the increase in the
number of feet per second per second by which the motion
of a body is accelerated." Anyone who has gotten the
meaning of this sentence clearly should be able to point out
immediately the error in the following statement, which if
correct would follow as a corollary to the above definition:
"The unit of incration is one foot per second per second."
(The correction is indicated in a footnote.) If the reader is
unable to point out the error it is merely because he has not
gotten the meaning of the definition, which is something quite
apart from the words by which it is symbolized and consists
of images either of the motion of a body or of the path of its
motion. Without such images we are confident the meaning
can in no way be appreciated.1
As has been said, the utterance of sentences or of parts
of sentences or of analogous statements often helps to bring
out the meaning, that is, helps to call up the imagery neces-
sary to build up the meaning, or helps to fix the meaning in
mind by symbolizing it after it is appreciated. But the
meaning may exist entirely independent and apart from
any utterance, either overt or implicit.
One often hears the expression from pupils in school:
" I know but I can't tell." This is generally a simple case
of having a meaning or idea without the ability to symbolize
it in language.
Moreover, as has been stated, even an adult may have
experienced perceptions, ideas, or feelings which he will
declare cannot be expressed in words. Even if they could,
1
 The correct statement is: The unit of incration is one foot per second per second
per second.
A reasonable comprehension of the meanings of these statements may be built
up with the help of the following leading statements. The rate of motion of a body
is the number of feet per second which it moves. The unit of rate is one foot per
second. The acceleration of a moving body is the increase in its rate, that is, the
increase in the number of feet per second which it moves in succeeding seconds. The
unit of acceleration is one foot per second per second, that is, one foot per second every
second. And again, the incration of a moving body is the increase in its acceleration,
that is, the increase (from second to second) in the number of feet per second by which
its rate is increased, or in other words, it is the number of feet per second per second
by which the motion of the body is accelerated. The unit of incration is the unit of
acceleration every second, that is, it is one foot per second per second per second.
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his inability to do so testifies to the independence of the
thoughts from the language by which it would be symbolized.
We say of our memory of a sunset that it was 'indescribable'
and 'would have to be seen to be appreciated,' which is
entirely true. We say, 'Words fail me' regarding the
expression of our thoughts of past emotional experiences.
The emotional experiences of love, hate, fear, anger, etc.,
may be the material of thought just as well as the experience
of perceiving the color blue. Even our best attempts to
express our thoughts of experiences in words often fail to
carry full meaning to the hearer unless he has had a similar
experience. Thus, one may say that an experience was like
that of a sudden drop in an elevator or like flying in an
aeroplane, but unless the hearer has had an analogous
sensation or experience the expression is devoid of essential
meaning to him. What can the expression, 'like being struck
by lightning' or 'like finding oneself caught under the ice'
mean to one who has not had the experience in comparison
to what it means to one who has had the experience! Yet
the language is identical in the two cases. One and the
same expression from the lips of an oratorical person may
convey a meaning to one hearer which will call forth tears, a
meaning to another hearer which will call forth anger, and a
meaning to still another hearer which will call forth laughter.
Such a phenomenon would be of course entirely impossible
if there were but one meaning to the expression, a meaning
inherent in the language itself. It is a platitude that the
meaning of language is something which is brought to it
from the experience of the hearer, that it does not reside in
the language.
6. The Genesis of Language.—Not only may we have
thoughts for which we cannot think of the existing appro-
priate language, but we may often have an idea for which
there is no corresponding word or phrase. Indeed language
is built up by the coining of new words and phrases that are
needed to symbolize new thoughts for which no corresponding
language exists. The word, automobile, for example, did
not come into existence until after there had been made,
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or at least conceived, a machine which would move itself,
and which needed a name. Similarly the expression, 'carry-
on,' came into use in response to the need of a name for an
action which was well comprehended but for which no con-
venient language equivalent existed. Ideas originate first;
afterward they are named—symbolized in language.
Perhaps the clearest example of the temporal relation
between the genesis of ideas and their symbolization is the
case of the naming of persons. First the child, which we
perceive, is born. Afterward it is given a name. Why do
we give a child a name? It is, of course, for the reason that
to refer to it always by description would be cumbersome
and inaccurate. When we think of a person deliberately we
think of his form and features, his speech, manner, expression,
etc. When we think of him more fleetingly, however, our
imagery becomes attenuated, even perhaps to the extent
exemplified by the representation of Roosevelt by merely a
pair of glasses and a row of teeth. But for the purpose of
one person conveying the thought of an individual to another,
such attenuated imagery is inexpedient. We therefore
symbolize the whole picture or idea of the individual by a
single word (a name). The name then, in cases of rapid
thinking, may nearly take the place of the concept of the
individual as imaged. The name, however, still does carry
with it something of the original imagery. The idea of
'James' to one person carries with it something which char-
acterizes his brother, James. The idea, James, to another
person, carries with it something which characterizes his
uncle, James, a different individual. This additional some-
thing is needed to constitute the difference in meaning be-
tween 'James' for the one person and 'James' for the other.
To a third person who knows no one by the name of James,
the idea is merely a word, known to refer to some individual.
On the other hand the perception of a person whose name
is not known does not carry with it any idea of a name, nor
need any word come to the mind. When I see a man I do
not think 'man.' When I think of a crowd of persons I do
not think of a crowd of words! Language is as distinct from
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the ideas it represents as the name of a person is distinct
from the perception of the person himself.
An infant of course does not use language habits until a
year or so after birth. Yet an infant can think—perceive,
compare, judge, choose, decide, act upon decision, etc.—
before language habits begin. The material of his thoughts
is the sights, sounds, smell, tastes, feelings, etc., which he
experiences throughout his waking state.
To illustrate the genesis of language habits we must go
back to the early days of a child's life when it is just beginning
those 'Abbreviated and short-circuited actions (which) be-
come a necessity if it is to hold its own in that environment
and make progress' (p. 319). The child's perception of its
doll, its desire for the doll, its idea of searching for the doll
when not in sight, its idea of creeping toward the doll when
seen, its idea of reaching for the doll when within reach, its
idea of grasping and the new ideas which arise from the
manipulation of the doll—assuming these ideas sufficiently
well fixed by habit that the actions have reached an ' abbrevi-
ated and short-circuited' stage and are purposeful and
adaptive—these ideas constitute the beginnings of thought
(conscious adjustment to the environment).
The stimulus, ' tata ' (p. 320), cannot call up the concept,
doll, before the concept, doll, is in existence. Nor can it
create the idea. The child must have some idea of the doll,
formed from perceptions of the doll itself, before the idea of
' tata ' can be associated with it. Language in general
bears just the same relation to thought in general that the
idea, 'tata,' as a word, bears to the idea of the doll, as some-
thing seen, touched, etc.
Similarly the idea of number is formed before any symbol
representing number can be associated with it. We may
talk about number in the hearing of a child for months after
it has begun the use of language, but until the child has by
observation and comparison become conscious of the two-
ness of ks hands, of the two-ness of its feet, and of the two-ness
of many other separate things, so that the idea of two-ness as
an abstraction becomes a separate idea in the child's mind—
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until this time the sound of the word 'two' is meaningless
to the child, and only attains meaning when finally associated
with this abstract idea of the two-ness of any two things.
The meaning comes first; afterward the language symbol
(word) is associated with the meaning and may be substi-
tuted for it when occasion demands. One has but to attempt
to teach a child, who is just learning to talk, to count and
deal with number concepts to see how absolutely meaningless
the words are to the child until he has had opportunity in the
course of his daily experiences to make the abstractions neces-
sary to form these ideas. We may teach a three-year child
to pronounce perfectly the sentence: "The square root of
twenty-five is five," and if the action of language mechanisms
constituted thought we should expect the child to understand
perfectly the meaning of what he had saidl Further com-
ment seems unnecessary.
It will be noted that in this discussion it has been neces-
sary to use concepts which are not found in Behaviorist
psychology. These are the concepts of 'meaning,' 'idea,'
'concept,' 'conscious,' 'purposeful,' 'association of ideas,'
'abstraction,' 'symbolization,' etc. Yet these are funda-
mental to structural psychology and from the above dis-
cussion we deem it apparent that a consideration of the
acquisition of language habits, their function in thinking,
and the material of truly non-language thought, is totally
inadequate without these concepts. To be sure we find
passages in a Behaviorist psychology attempting to state
what goes on in the mind of an individual. Thus (p. 305):
"We manipulate vocally" (in attempting to recall the
name of a familiar person) "by running over the names
beginning with each succeeding letter of the alphabet, or by
saying 'black hair,' 'blue eyes,' 'six feet tall,' and the like."
This seems to the writer to be one of several excursions quite
outside the realm of Behaviorist psychology. He does not
know whence these ideas came but judges that it was by
some sort of inference, partly because the Behaviorist does
not use introspection and partly because he is unable to
corroborate them by introspection.
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7. The Inadequacy of the Behaviorist Conception of Thought.
—To illustrate what is believed to be the wholly inadequate
conception of thought as entertained by the Behaviorist,
we cite the soliloquy postulated on page 332. "The implicit
word processes (aroused by whatever previous stimulus)
'it's a fine day, I think I will go to the races; it's twelve
o'clock now, I have just time to catch the train,' serve to start
you to get your hat and field glasses. Some unfinished
work meets your eye or other conflicting word processes are
aroused, as 'but I have to write those letters and I have a
luncheon engagement with X.' These tend to drive the
organism as a whole into some other form of action; for a
time there is a conflict (inhibition). Finally when the
conflict is over the final word act issues, 'Well, I guess I'll
have to give up the races and write those letters and keep
my engagement with X.' Here we see implicit word pro-
cesses tending to arouse overt acts and actually arousing
the initial steps. But since the human individual is a com-
pletely integrated affair, associated word processes arise
which may drive the organism into a totally different form of
activity from that which was first initiated."
The writer contends that the 'previous stimulus' together
with the mental activity which called forth this soliloquy
would be sufficient to start one to get his hat and field glasses,
without the accompaniment of any action of language
mechanisms, and that such action itself would not suffice.
The reasoning is as follows. Let us suppose the previous
stimulus to be the perception of the green grass and sun-
shine and warmth of the outdoors. This perception called
forth by association the memory of previous days when
races were attended and of the accompanying pleasure.
These memories contained the urge to renew the pleasures.
They gave rise to the decision which is expressed in the
language: "It 's a fine day, I think I will go to the races."
The decision made, the thought took form in vocal expression.
At this point either the clock struck twelve, this serving as a
stimulus, or the idea of going to the races naturally called
up the idea of when to go, which in turn suggested the
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idea of looking at the clock, resulting in the perception that
it was just twelve o'clock. None of this mental activity-
required language. The perception of the time of day-
having been made in one way or another, the idea called
up the words which would express it and the individual added,
'It's twelve o'clock now.' What happened next? Presum-
ably at this point came the idea of going to the races by
train, followed immediately by the idea which if expressed
in words would be, 'When does the train go?' which in turn
called forth the memory that the train goes (let us say) at
twelve-fifteen. Immediately there came to the mind the
idea of the preparation which is necessary to catch the
train and a judgment is made as to how long this will take,
based upon past experience. The individual must also go
through a certain mental operation of determining how much
time there is available before train time and make a com-
parison between these lengths of time in order to make the
decision which when expressed in words is, ' I have just time
to catch the train.' This idea possibly suggests the idea of
haste which together with the idea of going to the races calls
forth ideas of the appropriate preparation, getting the hat
and field glasses, etc. These latter ideas take form in action.
In view of the obvious necessity for the mental activity of
perception, judgment, decision, etc., intervening between
the advents of the ideas which took form in the language
quoted, we submit that, as stated above, it is impossible
that the soliloquy postulated could of itself have given
rise to the getting of the hat and field glasses. Moreover,
the ideas themselves which suggested the soliloquy could
have given rise to the acts and there need have been no
language, explicit or implicit, involved whatever. Thus,
the ideas of time may have been conceived in visual imagery—
the imagery of the face of the clock and the movement or
path of the minute hand. No language is required. The
ideas of preparation for the train would consist of memory
of the acts of getting hat and field glasses, walking or riding
to the station, buying the ticket, etc., these consisting chiefly
of visual and kinsesthetic images. No language is necessary.
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The ideas involved in the judgment of distance (to the
station) or of time required for preparation and traversing
the distances, etc., would be kinassthetic or visual or other
ideas of space and motion, the comparison of these ideas of
space and motion, etc., resulting in ideas of the relations
between them. No language is required. Moreover, the
ideas which take form in the acts of getting the hat and field
glasses are visual, tactual, and kinsesthetic and are quite
independent of language. The fact is, one could conceivably
note the weather, decide to go to the races, make preparations,
board the train, hand the conductor a ticket, note the progress
of the train, get off at the race track, pay the entrance fee,
and watch the races, all with mental activity and acts in
no way involving language. Any amount of soliloquy or
conversation may accompany the expedition, but this is
wholly incidental, secondary, and unessential.
8. Introspection.—We believe that Behaviorist psychology
is entirely sound within its own sphere, that is, so long as it
confines its study to the behavior of the individual as seen
from without. A psychology so limited, will, of course,
necessarily leave untouched a vast field of useful knowledge
which can in time be made scientific where not already so,
after extensive investigation, comparison of findings, deter-
mination of general tendencies, and the careful observation
of everyday experiences. But should one desire to explore
the realms of psychology outside the scope of Behaviorism,
he must then supplement his external observation by as
thoroughgoing, extensive, and careful an examination of that
which takes place within the mind—as seen from within—
as is possible by highly practiced and trained introspection.
To direct the attention to the color of an object is a
very easy matter. To direct the attention to the difference
in shade between two colors may be slightly less easy but it
is entirely possible. To direct the attention to the idea
of the aesthetic value of the colors requires perhaps appre-
ciably more practice, but it is none the less possible. How-
ever, to direct the attention to the nature of the mental
process of choosing between two colors, and to the manner
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in which the choice gives rise to appropriate acts, may be
quite difficult, not to say impossible, for the inexperienced
person. Yet these phenomena are available for observation
no less truly than the habit of typewriting is open to acquisi-
tion or the length of a rail is capable of being measured to
the thousandth of an inch. These accomplishments require
long practice or minute observation, but we do not say they
are impossible. An unpracticed person cannot direct his
attention to the less tangible aspects of thought any more
than he can play a theme on the piano. Because it is difficult
however, one does not forego the learning of piano playing,
if he desires to learn to play. Again, it is possible that no
two observers might obtain the same measurement of a
rail to the thousandth of an inch. Nevertheless we do not
say that measurement is of no use in physics. Observers
can nearly all agree on the length of a rail to the tenth of an
inch, and on the length of a needle to the hundredth of an
inch not to say to the thousandth.
Similarly in psychology, those inexperienced in intro-
spection may not be able to distinguish between middle C
on the piano and the C an octave above, or to observe that
they see objects double which are not focused upon. More-
over, persons highly trained in introspection may not always
be able to distinguish between the perception of a very faint
sound (as the distant ticking of a watch) from the auditory
image of the sound (imagined sound) nor to state just what
constitutes the mental element of difference between the
emotions of fear and anger. But there should be little differ-
ence of opinion between persons of extended experience in
introspection as to whether the material of our thoughts,
when we create new ideas, and conceive new modes of activity
in the fields of music, art, drama, mechanics, etc., is in the
form of language or in the form of tones, visual pictures, etc.
9. Summary.—There may be no experimental proof
whether or not thinking—conscious adjustment to the
environment—is invariably accompanied by the actuation
of some language mechanism as the larynx, lips, fingers, etc.,
in the incipient production of some form of language, spoken
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or written, but the evidence would seem to favor the belief
that no such invariable accompaniment is necessary. One
uses the eyes in observing objects attended to almost through-
out the waking state. It would seem more plausible to
assert therefore that some form of "implicit" eye movement
is a necessary accompaniment of all thinking. Much evi-
dence such as that from the observation of a chess player
studying his moves could be brought forth in support of
this view. All this, however, is quite beside the point.
The claim is made by the Behaviorist that "thought is the
action of language mechanisms" (italics mine). Certainly
the evidence against such an assertion is overwhelming.
Man is an organism highly adapted physiologically to his
environment, provided with sense organs of sight, hearing,
taste, smell, touch, pain, heat, cold, muscle movement,
body position, etc. Each of these sense organs is capable
of giving rise to sensations which take the form, in the
mind, of images or image patterns. (The word image is
used in a very broad sense as shown below.) The organism
has at its disposal any or all of these incoming percepts or
stored images or image patterns as material for thought, for
working over into new combinations, new thoughts, which
will give rise to new actions, new adaptations to the environ-
ment. In the event of the bringing together of two or more
concepts—images—or of the dividing of one concept into
two or more (as when a child first separates from the concept
ball the concept roundness)—in the event of this working
over of concepts, they are necessarily abbreviated, composited,
exemplified, attenuated, or substituted for by others. If the
substituted concepts are of a kind remote from the kind
for which they are substituted but are more or less definite
and commonly understood, we call them symbols. A careful
description of the manner in which thought material is
abbreviated, composited, attenuated (even to a point which
is considered by some psychologists to be *imageless'), etc.,
is of course quite impossible within the limits of this article.
However, the mental activity which brings forth a new
act may be the result of the combination or division or other
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working over of any type of mental material—the bare sensa-
tion, the fresh vivid full percept, the fairly vivid memory
image, or the image or image pattern when abbreviated, or
attenuated, or composited, or exemplified, or in any manner
generalized or particularized, or finally in the form of symbols.
And language, as has been shown, is but one general type of
symbol system.
In conclusion, then, let it be said that we may think in
words, and when we do, the thinking may be accompanied
by the action of language mechanisms. But thought—
even conscious mental adjustment—is not restricted to the
material of language any more than it is restricted to the
material of musical tones or of architectural designs or of
facial expressions, nor is it restricted to the action of language
mechanisms any more than it is to the mechanism of hearing
or of sight or of locomotion.
